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Esta tese tem como principal objectivo verificar a ocorrência e quantificar o 
impacto da política monetária Quantitative Easing (ou usando uma tradução livre, 
flexibilização quantitativa) na estrutura de capitais das empresas. Vai ser 
apresentadas teorias de política monetária convencionais e não convencionais. 
De seguida, vai-se analisar a implementação de Quantitative Easing por varios 
bancos centrais, entre eles a Reserva Federal, o Banco Central Europeu e o Banco 
de Inglaterra. Por fim, irá ser apresentado uma descrição das principais teorias 
da estrutura de capitais (teoria trade-off e pecking-order). 
Os nossos resultados vão contra a literatura existente. De acordo, com os 
nossos resultados o impacto da política de Quantiative Easing não tem impacto  
estatistico significativo na politica de financiamento da empresa. 
Palavras-chave:  Política monetária convencional; Política monetátia não 





The main goal of this thesis is to verify and quantify the impact of monetary 
policy Quantitative Easing on firms´ capital structure. It will be presented 
theories about conventional and unconventional monetary theory. Following, it 
will be analyze the implementation of Quantitative Easing by a few central banks, 
like the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank and the Bank of England. 
Finally, it will be presented a description of the prominent theories of capital 
structure (trade-off theory and pecking-order). 
Our results go against existing literature. According to our results the 
Quantitative Easing impact does not have statistically significance impact on the 
financing decision policy.  
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In recent years, central banks around the world have used both conventional 
and unconventional monetary policies to respond to the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis. Central banks have tried to reach a perfect combination between 
conventional (interest rate) and unconventional (credit easing) monetary 
strategies (De Fiore and Tristani, 2018). 
The topic of capital structure is one of the most searched topics and authors 
try to answer the following question: how firms choose the mix between equity 
and debt to finance their activities. The first widely accept theory was proposed 
by Modigliani and Miller (1958) which, in a perfect world, capital structure is 
irrelevant. 
In the best of our knowledge, research on impact of unconventional monetary 
policy (Quantitative Easing) on companies´ capital structure is scarce. So, the 
research question of this thesis is: Does Quantitative Easing impacts firms´ capital 
structure?   
In first place, it will be define what monetary policy is, after we will define and 
distinguish the difference between conventional and unconventional monetary 
policy. Next, it will be described the way each central bank implemented their 
Quantitative Easing (QE) and which channels chosen that allow this 
unconventional policy to affect the economy. Following that, it will be provided 
a definition of the most prominent capital structure theories, namely pecking-
order theory and static trade-off theory. Then, it will be necessary to recover data 
to try to prove and quantify said impact. 
In order to limit the analyses, we opted to quantify the impact for the euro-
area companies. To do so, we gathered information from 129 public companies 
by analyzing information obtained from Thompson Reuters and their annual 
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report. Our main results concluded that the Corporate Sector Purchase 
Programme (CSPP) was not statistically significance in explaining the capital 
structure for the 129 public companies chosen, so our data cannot quantify the 
impact of QE on those firms´ capital structure.      
The structure of the thesis will be as follow, section 2 will be the literature 
review regarding monetary policy, namely conventional and unconventional 
monetary policies. Also, it will provide a description and implementation 
mechanism of the different Quantitative Easing used by central banks in the 
study (Federal Reserve, European Central Bank and Bank of England). Then, it 
will be studied the most important capital structure theories. Section 3 will show 
the data description, the methodology adopted and the capital structure 
determinants. In section 4, it will be discuss the main results of the study 
including the univariate analysis and the regression analysis results. Finally, 
section 6 will present a brief summary of the thesis, including the final answer to 
our research question and suggestions for future research regarding this topic.     
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2. Literature Review 
On this chapter, it will be presented a literature review of monetary policy, 
quantitative easing and capital structure theories. Regarding monetary policy, 
we will provided a definition and will distinguish conventional from 
unconventional monetary policies. About quantitative easing, it will be described 
and it will be explained its implementation mechanism from different central 
banks, like Federal Reserve, European Central Bank and Bank of England. 
Finally, we will present an explanation of the different capital structure passing 
from Modigliani and Miller, to Pecking-order theory and to Static Trade-off.     
2.1. Monetary Policy  
The dominant objective of central banks are to create monetary policy that 
provide price stability to the economy (Castelnuovo, Nicoletti-Altimari and 
Rodríguez-Palenzuela, 2003; Fullwiler and Wray, 2010; Hellwig, 2014; Issing, 
2002; Johnson, Small and Tryon, 1999; Koetter et al., 2012; White, 2006). Monetary 
policy to be effective has to have transmission mechanism that allows central 
banks to affect actions and decisions of financial and non-financial companies 
and families (Balaceanu and Dragne, 2014). 
According to Galariotis, Makrichoriti and Spyrou (2017), central banks use 
monetary policy tools as a response to the volatility correlated with financial 
crisis or economic bubbles. 
Monetary policy should prevent money itself from being a foremost 
foundation of economic disturbance, should also offer a steady back-ground for 
the economy and should contribute to counterbalance major disruption in 
economic system arising from additional sources (Friedman, 1968). According to 
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Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999), “monetary policy significantly influences the 
short-term course of the real economy”. 
During atypical times, communication of monetary policy is crucial due to the 
high volatility of the economy. The addition of new policy tools can damage the 
expectation of policy actions (Coenen et al., 2017). 
In the next section, we will analyze the categorization of conventional and 
unconventional monetary policies. 
  
2.1.1. Conventional monetary policy 
According to Cúrdia and Woodford (2009), conventional monetary policy 
should center around interest rate. Also, conventional monetary policy can set 
nominal interest rate and can determine expected inflation, which in turn may 
determine structure of long-term interest rate on debt (Cochrane, 2014). 
Regarding Joyce, Miles, Scott and Vayanos (2012), conventional monetary 
policy changes “… short-term interest rate at which the central bank provided 
funds to banks or to the interbank market and the impact of official rate on 
market rates and the wider economy was reliably.”   
 
2.1.2. Unconventional monetary policy 
Unconventional monetary policy is out of the normal strategy of monetary 
policy (Lenza, Pill and Reichlin, 2016). Unconventional policy can be interpreted 
as the “monetary policy expanding central bank credit intermediation to offset a 
disruption of private financial intermediation” (Gertler and Karadi, 2011).  
Unconventional monetary policy can be seen as an alternative for interest rate 
policy (conventional policy) in the face of financial shock (De Fiore and Tristani, 
2018). As point out by Micossi (2015), unconventional policies used by central 
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banks were primarily directed to stabilize unique sectors of the financial systems, 
which were severely damaged by the crisis. 
As studied by Williams (2011), unconventional monetary policies tools are 
forward policy guidance and large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs). The forward 
policy guidance says that central banks have to keep short-term interest rate 
lower than they otherwise would and have to let inflation to be higher than 
otherwise would, however families and businesses may have a different set of 
expectations for the monetary policy and for the economy, so is crucial that the 
expectation channel is align for the optimal effectiveness of the forward guidance 
policy. On the other hand, LSAPs is the major substitute of the forward policy 
guideline. The LSAPs consist on the central bank acquiring securities financed by 
an increment of reserves. 
Another type of unconventional policy that was introduced by ECB as an 
answer to the European sovereign debt crisis, was the Outright Monetary 
Transaction (OMT). This policy grant ECB to acquire an unlimited amount of 
government bonds in secondary markets. As a consequence, there was a 
reduction of the spreads in sovereign bonds issued by Europeans countries more 
affected by the crisis (Acharya et al., 2016; Szczerbowicz, 2015). 
2.2. Quantitative Easing (QE) around the world 
According to Van Binsbergen et al. (2019), after the recent financial crisis 
government bonds yields had its premium reduced because of central bank use 
of conventional and unconventional monetary policies, in particular the use of 
Quantitative Easing (QE). QE is define by this author as the purchase of long-
term government treasury bonds. Recent literature, like Orphanides (2017), 
shows that QE policies have been efficiently “… printing money and purchasing 
government debt with the proceeds.” Despite concerns about rising inflation, the 
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Fed and the ECB have, on average, inflation under their respective goal since the 
recent crisis. 
As pointed out by Pinto and Correia (2017), by Szczerbowicz (2015) and by 
Beirne et al., (2011), the European Central Bank first Covered Bond Purchase 
Program allowed a decrease of the mortgage covered bonds (MCB) in the Euro 
area. Also, according to Pinto and Correia (2017) the second Covered Bond 
Purchase Program is positive correlated with the credit spreads for public 
covered bonds, but has no significant impact on MCB. The another result studied 
by Pinto and Correia (2017) was an indirect result, because they observed that 
despite not being included in the covered bond purchase program, asset-backed 
securities decreased its credit spread, this decrease was more intensely in 
countries like Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain. 
Fawley and Neely (2013) defends that QE policies increase the monetary base 
through asset purchase programs and lending programs, these programs are 
intended to upgrade the credit easing, so there is a catalyst for economic growth.   
In the next part of this chapter, we will analyze further QE instruments used 
by the Federal Reserve Bank, the European Central Bank and the Bank of England 
2.2.1. Federal Reserve 
As a response to the 2007-2008 financial crisis, the Fed lowered its traditional 
instrument (target federal funds rate) to the zero lower bound (ZLB). As the 
economy gone worse, and with this instrument on the maximum capacity, the 
Fed started to acquire vast amounts of assets (securities and bonds), 
denominated large scale asset purchases (LSAPs) with medium and long 
maturities, trying to decrease the interest rate to the private sector (families and 
business), specially with longer maturities. This action tries to increase inflation 
to the levels close to 2% in the medium term (Altavilla and Giannone, 2016; 
Gagnon et al., 2011; Hudson, 2010). Building on that, Bernanke and Reinhart 
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(2004) affirms that a way to stimulate the economy is to grow “…the size of the 
central banks’ balance sheet beyond the level needed to set the short term policy 
rate at zero (“quantitative easing”)”. 
 As stated before, the Fed in response to the financial crisis implemented 
LSAPs or commonly known as Quantitative Easing (QE). The first wave of LSAPs 
or QE1 commenced on November 25, 2008, when Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) publicized a program to acquire agency mortgage-backed 
securities (MBS), federal agency debt (issued by Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac) and long-term treasury bonds. The Fed purchase $1.725trillion that 
were divided by the following amount: $1.25 trillion in MBS, $175 billion in 
agency federal debt and $300 billion in long-term treasuries. Despite this 
aggressive program, the US was going into a deflationary trajectory, so FOMC 
introduced QE2, which entailed a total purchase of $778 billion in long-term 
Treasuries ($600 billion new and $178 billion reinvested from QE1. This 
program´s duration was from November 3, 2010 to June 30, 2011 at a rate of $75 
billion a month. Lastly, on September 13, 2012, FOMC launched QE3, which 
involves acquisition of $40 billion in MBS per month. On December 2012, FOMC 
added a $45 billion in long-term treasuries to the per month basis. One year later 
(December 2013), FOMC reduced in $10 billion the per month acquisition to $75 
billion, reducing $5 billion in MBS and $5 billion in treasuries. The end of QE3 
was on October 29, 2014 (Rodnyansky et al., 2017).  
In the next part, we will discuss channels through which QE operated. The 
first channel studied is Duration Risk Channel. When the Fed buys long-term 
treasuries, agency debt and MBS, this channel allows a decrease in the yield of 
all long-term assets, like treasuries, corporate bonds and mortgage, also, through 
this channel it is expected that longer duration assets suffers a higher reduction 
on the yield than shorter ones (Gagnon et al., 2010; Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen, 2011). Another channel use is the refinancing channel, regarding 
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Maggio et al. (2016) “Quantitative easing works through a refinancing channel 
by improving credit availability and lowering rates for affected households.”, 
also, there is an increase in the demand because of the improving credit and 
lower rates, this will imply a diminution of the monthly mortgage. The signaling 
channel may affect the price of assets because the market agents know about the 
economy performance and know how the central bank will react (Christensen 
and Krogstrup, 2018; Christensen and Rudebusch, 2012; Rosa, 2012). The QE3 
encouraged extra commercial and industrial lending and increased origination 
of home purchase mortgages, which conduced economically sizable growth in 
total employment, so LSAPs, like the conventional reduction of interest rate, 
affected real economic outcomes via a bank lending channel (Luck et al., 2018).   
2.2.2. European Central Bank (ECB) 
In response to the crisis of 2007-2008, the ECB started to implement its QE 
through the Asset Purchase Programme (APP). The first program was the 
Covered Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP1), it started at €60 billion and its 
duration was from July 2009 until June 2010. The second Covered Bond Purchase 
Programme (CBPP2) was from November 2011 to October 2012 and about €16.4 
billion. Another important program implemented was the Securities Markets 
Programme (SMP) that extended from May 2010 until September 2012 and its 
main goal was to acquire sovereign bonds through secondary markets. At the 
maximum the SMP portfolio was about €210 billion, the assets bought through 
this programme were held to maturity. Another additional programs started to 
respond to the sovereign debt crisis installed in Europe were the Asset-Backed 
Securities Purchase Programme (ABSPP) and the third Covered Bond Purchase 
Programme (CBPP3). They were implemented at September 2014. In January 
2015, there was an addition to the previous ABSPP and CBPP3, which was the 
inclusion of the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP). The total program 
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started with acquisition of €60 billion per month. In March 2016, APP was 
increased to 80€ billion per month with the inclusion of the Corporate Sector 
Purchase Programme (CSPP). In April 2017, PSPP was decreased to 60€ billion. 
Finally reducing to 30€ billion per month until the end (Abidi and Miquel-Flores, 
2018; Koijen, Koulischer, Nguyen and Yogo, 2018). 
As said earlier, APP comprised of €60 billion per month that were allocating 
the following away: €10 billion of ABS and covered bonds; 50€ billion of PSPP 
(6€ billion from supranational institution and 44€ billion to acquire purchase 
sovereign debt securities). The ECB has planned to acquire 836€ billion of euros 
of sovereign bonds. One of the main goals of the APP, in particularly PSPP is to 
help European public finances because there is a decrease of yields. (Claeys, 
Leandro and Mandra, 2015). 
The covered bond market is a very important privately issued bond segment 
in capital market of Europe. During the recent financial crisis, the credit spreads 
of covered bonds in the secondary markets widened and there was a stalled 
issuance in the primary market, also, liquidity in the secondary market 
worsened. As a response, ECB implemented the CBPP. The CBPP objectives 
were: (i) encouraging decline in money market term rates; (ii) easing funding 
conditions for credit institutions; (iii) Encouraging credit institutions to maintain 
and expand their lending to clients; and (iv) improving market liquidity in 
important segments of private debt securities market (Beirne et al., 2011).       
On March 10, 2016, ECB announced an addition to its APP, with the inclusion 
of the CSPP, which is usually named by corporate quantitative easing. So, APP 
consists of: (i) CBPP3; (ii) ASBPP; (iii) PSPP; and (iv) CSPP. The main objective of 
CSPP was to improve the financing conditional of Eurozone´s real economy. This 
was achieved by the fact that after March 2016, there was a decrease of yields on 
corporate bonds and a reduce of cost of borrowing for Eurozone non-financial 
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firms (Abidi and Miquel-Flores, 2018). Also, according to the author APP was 
constructed to bring inflation close to 2%. 
As mentioned by Andrade, Breckenfelder, Fiore, Karadi and Tristani (2016), 
there are three main transmission channels of QE purchases: (i) signaling 
channel; (ii) portfolio rebalancing channel; and (iii) reanchoring channel. The 
signaling channel works as a declaration from the central bank stating the interest 
rate policy will be preserved at the lower bound for a long time (Andrade et al., 
2016; Bhattarai, Eggertsson, Gafarov and State, 2014; Krishnamurthy, Nagel and 
Vissing-Jorgensen, 2017). The portfolio rebalancing or asset valuation channel 
that provides the market with an alteration of future expected returns (Andrade 
et al., 2016). And, finally, the last transmission channel is the reanchoring channel 
which means to give the private sector the confidence necessary to impulse the 
price level stability to normal levels, which implies inflation close to 2% (Andrade 
et al., 2016; Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2001; Gurkaynak, Sack and 
Swanson, 2005). 
2.2.3. Bank of England (BOE)  
To respond to the financial crisis of 2007-2008, BOE untied both conventional 
and unconventional monetary policies. The main element of the unconventional 
monetary policy tool used was the asset purchases financed by central bank, or 
quantitative easing (QE) (Joyce, Michael; Tong, Matthew; Woods, 2011) . The 
main goal of BOE´s QE was to restore confidence in the market to make inflation 
achieve the 2% goal (Christensen and Rudebusch, 2012b). The BOE asset 
purchase program was planned to disturb the yields and prices on a varied range 
of assets, in particularly bonds issued to finance lending to firms and families (M. 
Joyce, Miles, Scott and Vayanos, 2012b). 
The Bank of England created the Asset Purchase Fund (APF) and started to 
buy corporate bonds, commercial paper and government (gilts) bonds. The 
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commercial paper acquisition began on February 13, 2009. By February 2010, 
BOE had bought £200 billion of which £198 billion were gilts, and by 2012 BOE 
had purchased up to £375 billion of assets (M. A. S. Joyce, Lasaosa, Stevens and 
Tong, 2011; Ledenyov and Ledenyov, 2013). 
According to Gagnon, Joseph E (1999) BOE utilized three channels of QE´s 
transmission: (i) reducing risk spreads associated with market panics; (ii) 
reducing expectations of the future short-term interest rate policy; and (iii) 
reducing the term premium in gilts yields by reducing its long-term supply in 
the market which caused an increase in the gilts´ price. Building on that, Berry, 
Benfor and Robson (2009) argues that the main channel is the economic channel. 
This channel injects “… money into the economy, in return for other assets, 
increases the liquidity of private sector balance sheets”. This causes monetary 
expansion which drives spending, which is expected to increase inflation.  
2.3. Capital Structure 
This next section will provide a literature review of the main theories about 
capital structure, namely Modigliani-Miller, Pecking-Order Theory and Static 
trade-off.  
Despite capital structure theories being one of the most studied topics in the 
area of corporate finance, there more space for additional research in this topics, 
because this topic answers one of the most important decision of any firm, which 





The first modern capital structure theory was proposed by Modigliani and 
Miller (1958). This theory defends that exist a perfect competition in the capital 
market and an effortlessness access to those market, the market value of firms is 
independent of its capital structure and the expected return on equity (ROE) 
increases in the same dimension to the debt-equity ratio, this holds true because 
equity holders of the levered firm require a premium related to financial risk 
equivalent to the debt-to-equity ratio times the spread between expected rate of 
return in firms´ total assets and expected rate of return on debt (Chang, 2015; 
Glickman, 1996).   
2.3.2. Pecking-Order theory 
This model of financing decision assumes that firms do not target a specific 
debt ratio, however they only use money outside of the company when internal 
funds are insufficient. External funds are less desired because of the existence of 
asymmetries of information between management and investors. Also, the 
business prefer debt to equity if it has to issue securities. Companies pursue 
financial reserves to evade the use of external, so the way that funds are used is 
the following, first the company uses internal funds (reserves), after issues new 
debt and as last resort, the firm will issue new equity (Graham and Harvey, 1999; 
Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
2.3.3. Static trade-off 
The other famous capital structure theory is the static trade-off theory, that 
according to Frydenberg (2004) defends that firms might try to adjust their capital 
structure to some target, leverage depends on restrictions in the debt-contracts, 
take-over possibilities and managements´ reputation. 
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The trade-off theory affirms that companies have an optimal debt-equity ratio, 
which is determined by trading off the benefits of debt. After established a target 
debt-to-equity value ratio, the firms gradually moves towards that target and the 
firms will be adjusting its dividends policy to move to the optimal target payout 
ratio. So, this model express a trade-off between the benefits of the use of debt 




3. Sample selection, methodology and variables 
This next section is divided in three parts. The first is entitled data description 
and will provide a description of the database used, the second part is the 
methodology adopted and will indicate the specification of our model and the 
type of regression used, lastly, the third part is the capital structure determinants 
and will specify the determinants used in our model. 
3.1. Data Description 
We chose 129 firms with headquarters in the euro area. Firms´ accounting and 
market data were extracted from Thompson Reuters DataStream. The firms´ 
credit rating was manually extracted from their annual reports. 
To achieve to this 129 companies, we extracted data from Thompson Reuters, 
then we eliminated the companies that did not provided the full information for: 
(i) market value of total debt; (ii) market value of total assets; (iii) fixed assets; (iv) 
depreciation and amortization; (v) CAPEX; (vi) market to book ratio; (vii) EBIT; 
(viii) EBITDA and (ix) Effective tax rate.  
As in Grosse-Rueschkamp et al. (2018) we chose companies from all sectors of 
the economy with the exception of financial firms. 
Data were extracted for the 2009-2018 period so that the determinants of 
capital structure could be analyzed before and after the beginning of the CSPP, 
this program begin in 2016. 
 
3.2. Methodology 
To address our research question, it is vital to our dependent variable, define 
leverage. Harris and Raviv (1991) define leverage as the ratio between total debt 
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and total assets. Silva and Pinto (2018) define leverage as the ratio between book 
value of debt and book value of equity because they analyze a sample of private 




 , where 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡  is the leverage ratio for company i in year t, 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡  is the market value of total debt for company i in year t and 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 is the market value of total asset for company i in year t. 
Grosse-Rueschkamp et al, (2018), Abidi and Miquel-Flores (2018), and Arce, 
Gimeno and Mayordomo (2017) use the dummy variable CSPP that takes value 
1 if the period is after the implementation of the CSPP, so if the year is 2016-2018 
period, the dummy takes the value one and zero otherwise. The authors also use 
a dummy variable that take value one if firm is eligible for the program and zero 
otherwise; i.e., takes the value one if companies has a credit rating of BBB by 
Standard and Poors and Fitch or Baa3  by Moody or higher, and zero otherwise. 
We estimate the impact of the CSPP program on firms´ leverage using an 
ordinary least square (OLS) model. The specification of the model is:  
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑁𝐷𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
3.3. Capital Structure determinants 
In this next part of the chapter, it will be discussed the determinants that 
influence the level of leverage in a firm and its predicted effect on leverage. 
3.3.1. Taxes 
According to DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) 
and Miller (1977), when tax rates are higher, firms will have more debt to capture 
higher interest tax shields. We calculate the effective tax rate as in Silva and Pinto 
(2018), using the ratio between effective tax paid and pre-tax earnings. Our 
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expectation is to find a positive correlation between effective corporate tax rates 
and leverage. 
 
3.3.2. Tangibility (tang) 
As pointed out by Harris and Raviv (1991), Myers (1977), and Scott (1977), 
tangible assets are easily collateralize and, as a consequence, will decrease the 
agency cost of debt. So, we are expecting that tangibility will have a negative 
impact on leverage. 
Like Bevan and Danbolt (2000), Huang and Song (2002), and Pandey (2001), 
we will use the ratio between fixed assets and total assets as a proxy for 
tangibility. 
3.3.3. Profitability (profit) 
Fama and French (2002), Harris and Raviv (1991), Jensen (1986), and Myers 
and Majluf (1984), asset that profitability is the quantity of earnings accessible to 
be used by the company. Fama and French (2002) argues that an increase of 
profitability decrease the leverage and this interaction is in line with pecking-
order theory. As in Frank and Goyal (2007), we use the EBITDA divided by total 
assets as a proxy for profitability. 
3.3.4. Growth opportunity (growth) 
According to Fama and French (2002) and Silva and Pinto (2018), firms with a 
higher growth potential have less debt because: (i) they reinvest their retained 
earnings in opportunities to expand, leaving them with no cash to “…invest in 
organizational inefficiencies;” and (ii) they are specially keen to avoid problems 
of underinvestment and asset substitution problems. Trade-off theory predicts 
that higher growth opportunities will lead to less leverage, but pecking-order 
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predicts that companies with higher investment plans will tend to accumulate 
more debt [Frank and Goyal (2007), Harris and Raviv (1991),  and Myers (1977)]. 
As in Frank and Goyal (2007) and Silva and Pinto (2018), our proxy for growth 
opportunities is the division between CAPEX and total assets. 
3.3.5. Firm size (size) 
On the one hand, pecking-order theory predicts that larger firms tend to need 
less debt than smaller firms. On the other hand, trade-off theory points out that 
larger firms are more diversified and face a lower default risk [Frank and Goyal 
(2007), Harris and Raviv (1991), and Titman and Wessels (1988)]. The evidence 
about this impact on leverage are diverse: on the one hand, Harris and Raviv 
(1991) found a positive correlation; on the other hand Frank and Goyal (2007) 
found evidence of the two situations (positive and negative correlations). We will 
use logarithm of total assets as a proxy for the firm size as in Frank and Goyal 
(2007), and Silva and Pinto (2018). 
3.3.6. Business risk (risk) 
According to Frank and Goyal (2007) and Myers (1984), business risk disturbs 
companies´ financing decision. Following the thought of trade-off theory, a 
company with higher earnings volatility faces higher expected costs of financial 
distress, so it will have a lower leverage. Following the thought of pecking-order 
theory, it is predicted that riskier companies have higher leverage. 
As in Silva and Pinto (2018), we will use standard deviation of EBIT as a proxy 
for business risk. 
3.3.7. Non-debt tax shields (NDTS) 
Non-debt tax shields are an alternative for tax advantages of issuing debt. 
Companies with higher non-debt tax shields have lower debt [DeAngelo and 
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Masulis (1980) and Titman and Wessels (1988)]. We use depreciation and 
amortizations divided by total assets as a proxy for non-debt tax shields as in 
Silva and Pinto (2018). 
 
3.3.8. Investment opportunity (Invest) 
Following Bevan and Danbolt (2000) and Pandey (2001), we use market to 
book value of total assets as a proxy for investment opportunities. Myers (1977) 
stresses that firms with large quantities of investment opportunities will have a 
lower debt ratio. 
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4. Main Results 
In this chapter we present both the univariate and the regression analyses. 
4.1. Univariate analysis 
Table 2 and Table 3, present the descriptive statistics for the dependent 
variable Leverage (Lev) and for the independent variables CSPP, CSPP*Eligible, 
Taxes, Tang, Profit, Growth, Size, Risk, NDTS and Invest. Also, it presents 
Wilcoxon tests for discrete variables and Fisher´s exact test for dummies 
variables. 
The mean effective tax rate increased from 32.23% to 44.86%, while the median 
decreased from 28.05% to 26.19%. Also, we verify that the mean tangibility has a 
very low decrease from 26.45% to 25.55%, the median tangibility maintains 
around 23%, we can say the same from the mean and median of the profitability, 
which means that the CSPP do not interfere with the profitability of firms. We 
confirm that growth opportunity upholds stable with the introduction of this 
program. We note that there was a slightly increase in the firms size from 16.06 
to 16.30. We also conclude that the mean (median) risk decrease from 0.3333 
(0.3025) to 0.2928 (0.2372). While the non-debt tax shield remained stable there 
has been an increase in the investment opportunity after the implementation of 
the CSPP. 
4.2. Regression analysis 
To answer our research question, we perform an OLS regression. Our model 
is the following: 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑁𝐷𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
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We will provide the estimation of coefficients for three different set: (i) it will 
research the full database provided from 2009-2018; (ii) it will be research the 
data from before 2016, which is before the CSPP implementation and (iii) it will 
research the dataset from after 2016 (after the implementation of CSPP). 
In the following table, Table 1, it will be shown the results obtain from the OLS 
regression of euro-area public firms for the 2009-2018 period. Our sample 
consists of 1117 results. For each independent variable we provide the coefficient, 
p-value and standard error. We use robust. *, ** and *** denote statistical 




  Model (ii)   Model (iii)   
Lev Coef Std. Erro Coef Std. Erro Coef Std. Erro 
  p-value  p-value  p-value   
              
Independent Variable       
CSPP 0,0005 0,0171      
  -0,975       
CSPP*Eligible -0,0022 0,01872      
  0,908       
Taxes 0,0023 0,002 0,0074 0,0017 0,0001 0,0019 
  0,255  (0,000)***  0,942   
Tang 0,2167 0,029 0,2394 0,036 0,1508 0,0516 
  (0,000)***  (0,000)***  (0,004)***   
Profit -0,2437 0,1262 -0,2383 0,1334 -0,1399 0,2774 
  (0,054)*  (0,074)*  0,614   
Growth -0,9294 0,277 -0,7915 0,3075 -1,249 0,7191 
  (0,001)***  (0,01)**  (0,083)*   
Size 0,0108 0,0026 0,0103 0,0028 0,0123 0,0042 
  (0,000)***  (0,000)***  (0,004)***   
Risk 0,0693 0,026 0,0808 0,0398 0,0522 0,0294 
  (0,008)***  (0,043)**  (0,077)*   
NDTS 1,5341 0,3141 1,5673 0,3619 1,3367 0,756 
  (0,000)***  (0,000)***  (0,078)**   
Invest -0,0001 0,00002 -0,0065 0,0074 -0,0001 0,00002 
  (0,000)***  0,379  (0,001)***   
         
         
N 1117  796  321   
Adjusted R^2 0,1315  0,1535  0,1124   
Overal F-test 22,37   17,36   28,96   
Table 1- The results obtain from the OLS regression 
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Next, we interpret the results obtained and compare them to the expected 
result from the extant literature. 
Abidi and Miquel-Flores (2018), Arce et al. (2017), and Grosse-Rueschkamp et 
al. (2018) find that the CSPP and CSPP*Eligible should be statistically      
significance. However our results indicate that they are not. One of the reason 
might be that their model used quarterly data while we use annual data. 
Contrary to what is pointed out by DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), Kraus and 
Litzenberger (1973), and Miller (1977), which predicts taxes have a positive 
impact on leverage, we find an insignificance relationship between these two 
variables..  
In line with Frank and Goyal (2007), Harris and Raviv (1991), Myers (1977), 
and Scott (1977) we find that tangibility have a negative relationship with 
leverage. 
We find that profitability have a negative relationship with leverage, as 
predicted by extant literature [Fama and French (2002); Frank and Goyal (2007), 
Harris and Raviv (1991), Jensen (1986), and Myers and Majluf (1984)]. 
Our data allows us to conclude that growth opportunity is negatively 
correlated with leverage, this goes in accordance with trade-off theory that says 
that firms with high growth potential reinvest its gains to expand and don’t 
waste money with organizational inefficiencies Fama and French (2002). 
On one hand, following static trade-off theory large firms tend to have higher 
levels of debt, on the other hand, following pecking-order theory larger firms 
tend to have less debt than smaller firms Frank and Goyal (2007) and Harris and 
Raviv (1991). We find that size has a positive relationship with leverage, which 
goes in favor of static trade-off theory. 
Frank and Goyal (2007) and Myers (1984) defends that risk has a negative 
relationship with leverage according to static trade-off theory, however, 
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according to pecking-order theory affirms that risk has a positive relationship 
with leverage. Our data indicates that risk has a positive impact on leverage. 
Literature review of DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) and Titman and Wessels 
(1988) defends that non-debt tax shields have a negative impact on leverage. 
However, our data shows that non-debt tax shields have a positive impact on 
leverage. 
Finally, according to Myers (1977) and Titman and Wessels (1988) investment 
opportunity have a negative impact on leverage. Our results defend that 
investment opportunity has, indeed, a negative impact on leverage, but its 




This thesis analyses whether Quantitative easing programs have an impact on 
firms´ capital structure. Prior to this study, literature review around this specific 
topic is scarce. We, thus, intend to fill this gap in the literature.   
QE programs were used as a response to the recent financial crisis which 
created a lack of liquidity in the overall economy. Its effects are felt in both the 
short-term and in the long-term.  
This study aggregates 129 companies from the euro area and analyses data 
from 2009 to 2018. Some of the information was either not completed on 
Thomson Reuters or it didn’t exist at all, so to overcome this, we had to gather 
information from other sources, specially their annual report and do a cross-
section of information to obtain a more complete database. Since, the credit rating 
was not available at our Thomson Reuters database, we had to obtain each of the 
public company’s annual report.  
This work intends to contribute to the available literature about QE and capital 
structure in multiple ways. First, we review the literature on monetary policies, 
focusing on both conventional and unconventional monetary policies. 
Conventional monetary policy are the direct interference of the short term 
interest rate Friedman (1968). As pointed out by De Fiore and Tristani (2018), 
unconventional monetary policy takes a different approach and tries to create 
credit easing. 
After, we describe the different implementation of the QE around the world, 
in specific, the programs implemented by Fed, ECB and BOE. The Fed 
implemented the LSAP, the ECB implemented the APP and the BOE 
implemented the APF. These programs intended to increase the central banks’ 
lending to the banks and a decrease the overall interest rate. With lower cost of 
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borrowing and a more aggressive purchases program there would increase the 
economy wealth. With that, it should be expected an increase of spending and 
income that would result the inflation to achieve 2%, which is the one of the goals 
of the mentioned central banks. 
As stated before, capital structure is one of the most reviewed topics in the 
literature of corporate finance. We had to find the most prominent determinants 
that influence the financial decision of companies. We chose the following 
determinants: (i) taxes; (ii) tangibility; (iii) profitability; (iv) growth opportunity; 
(v) firm size; (vi) risk; (vii) non-debt tax shields; (viii) investment opportunity. To 
measure the QE we introduced a dummy (CSPP) to quantify if the leverage 
changed after the introduction of the program. Another variable was introduced, 
the CSPP*Eligible, this dummy quantified the impacted of the companies that 
were eligible for the CSPP had on its leverage ratio. 
Our results indicate that the impact of both variables CSPP and CSPP*Eligible 
– measures for the impact of the Corporate Sector Purchase Programme – on 
capital structure is insignificant. Similar results were obtain for Taxes variable. 
According to our results, tangibility, firm size, risk and non-debt tax shields have 
a positive relationship to the leverage ratio. On the contrary, profitability and 
growth opportunities have a negative impact on firms´ leverage. 
Our data has mixed results when compared with the most prominent capital 
structure theories: on the one hand, we verify a negative impact of growth 
opportunities and firm size on leverage, which is in line with the static trade-off 
theory; on the other hand, in line with pecking-order theory, we find a positive 
impact of risk on leverage. 
A possible future research could be an analysis of this study but applied to 
other regions where a similar QE programs were implemented, also we could 
analyze the impact of the CSPP on European equity market.  
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Complete Database Before 2016 After 2016 Wilcoxon 
test Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean  Median 
Lev 1117 0,2725 0,2495 796 0,2734 0,2497 321 0,27 1 0,9101 
Taxes 1117 0,3586 0,2723 796 0,3223 0,2805 321 0,4486 0,2312 0,0063 * 
Tang 1117 0,2619 0,2324 796 0,2645 0,2365 321 0,2555 0,1033 0,2959 
Profit 1117 0,1155 0,1063 796 0,1165 0,1073 321 0,1128 0,034 0,4078 
Growth 1117 0,0423 0,034 796 0,0433 0,0348 321 0,0399 16,8656 0,3223 
Size 1117 16,1261 16,6342 796 16,0565 16,4822 321 16,2989 0,2372 0,0432** 
Risk 1117 0,3216 0,2813 796 0,3333 0,3025 321 0,2928 0,2372 0,000 *** 
NDTS 1117 0,04 0,036 796 0,0404 0,0361 321 0,0376 0,0336 0,087* 
Invest 1117 3,2104 1,78 796 2,0032 1,68 321 6,2038 2,04 0,0003 *** 














Variable      
CSPP 1117 321 0,287377 (0,000) # 
Eligible 1117 756 0,676813 (0,000) # 
CSPP*Eligible 1117 223 0,199642 (0,000) # 
Table 3 - Data description and Fisher´s exact test 
